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Inkblot: The Ninth Amendment as Textual
Justification for Judicial Enforcement of the
Right to Privacy
Kurt T. Lasht
I. A TALE OF Two LAW PROFESSORS: ROBERT BORK AND PHILIP
KURLAND ON THE NINTH AMENDMENT
One of the more indelible moments in late twentieth-
century legal discourse occurred when Judge Robert Bork de-
scribed the proper response of a judge confronted with the Ninth
Amendment., Nominated to replace retiring Supreme Court Jus-
tice Lewis Powell, Judge Bork appeared before the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee and declared that courts had no business en-
forcing the mysterious clause at all. Given the scarcity of
historical evidence regarding the original meaning of the
amendment, using the Ninth Amendment to strike down a law
would say more about the predilections of the judge than the re-
quirements of the text. Here is the famous exchange:
Judge Bork: ... I think the ninth amendment therefore may
be a direct counterpart to the 10th amendment. The 10th
amendment says, in effect, that if the powers are not dele-
gated to the United States, it is reserved to the States or to
the people.
And I think the ninth amendment says that, like pow-
ers, the enumeration of rights shall not be construed to deny
or disparage rights retained by the people in their State
Constitutions. That is the best I can do with it.
Senator DeConcini: Yes. You feel that it only applies to their
State constitutional rights.
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Judge Bork: Senator, if anyone shows me historical evidence
about what they meant, I would be delighted to do it. I just
do not know.
Senator DeConcini: I do not have any historical evidence.
What I want to ask you is purely hypothetical, Judge. Do
you think it is unconstitutional, in your judgment, for the
Supreme Court to consider a right that is not enumerated in
the Constitution-
Judge Bork: Well, no.
Senator DeConcini: -to be found under article IX?
Judge Bork: ... I do not think you can use the ninth
amendment unless you know something of what it means.
For example, if you had an amendment that says "Congress
shall make no" and then there is an inkblot and you cannot
read the rest of it and that is the only copy you have, I do
not think the court can make up what might be under the
inkblot if you cannot read it.2
Judge Bork suspected that the Ninth Amendment ought to
be read as a companion to the Tenth Amendment, with both
provisions serving to protect the retained rights of the people in
the states. Nevertheless, absent additional evidence, Bork be-
lieved judicial enforcement of the Ninth Amendment was inap-
propriate. This meant that Justices William Douglas and Arthur
Goldberg erred in their respective opinions in Griswold u Con-
necticut3 by suggesting the Ninth Amendment helped justify the
Court's identification and enforcement of the right to privacy.4
Criticism of Judge Bork's position on the Ninth Amendment
and unenumerated rights was a major theme among opponents
to his nomination.5 During the same confirmation hearings,
Bork's former colleague, Professor Philip Kurland, testified that
2 The Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States, Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong, 1st Sess
249 (1987) (statement of Robert H. Bork) ("Bork Hearing").
3 381 US 479 (1965).
4 See id at 484 (Douglas); id at 487 (Goldberg concurring).
5 According to Professor Sanford Levinson, Judge Robert Bork's nomination to the
Supreme Court was defeated "largely because of his refusal to acknowledge the 'unenu-
merated right to privacy." Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth
Amendment, 64 Chi Kent L Rev 131, 135 (1988).
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the research Kurland conducted for the creation of the five-
volume set of books known as The Founders' Constitution6 estab-
lished the Ninth Amendment as a declaration of unenumerated
natural rights.7 According to Kurland, Judge Bork's failure to
understand the Ninth Amendment as authorizing judicial en-
forcement of unenumerated rights against the states was a ma-
jor reason why Bork should not be confirmed.8
In retrospect, Kurland's confident assertion about the origi-
nal meaning of the Ninth Amendment is surprising and, as it
turns out, demonstrably incorrect. Although Professor Kurland
6 Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, 1-5 The Founders' Constitution (Chicago
1987).
7 For example, here is an exchange between Chairman Joseph Biden and Professor
Kurland during the Senate Hearings:
The Chairman: Professor Kurland, is your view on the right of privacy the
same as Judge Bork's, to the best of your knowledge, to the extent that one ex-
ists or does not exist within the Constitution?
Mr. Kurland: It is not now, no. That is, I have come to realize this through the
book that I just edited, which was the-it is called "The Founders' Constitu-
tion" and consists of all of the, or most of the writings and documents relating
to the framing.
I have come to a different realization of the breadth of the rights of Eng-
lishmen, that was sought to be protected by the Constitution makers.
So that while I was prepared to argue as to whether the right of privacy
should be included among those rights, my position now is that there is no
doubt about the Court's capacity to create that right. Not to create it, but to af-
firm it.
Bork Hearing, 100th Cong, 1st Sess at 2860 (cited in note 2).
8 See id. See also Philip B. Kurland, Bork: The Transformation of a Conservative
Constitutionalist, 9 Cardozo L Rev 127, 131-33 (1987) (describing Bork's theory of "un-
limited" government powers against individuals, in light of the Ninth Amendment and
the history surrounding it, as based on a "myopic" reading of history). Professor Kurland
was deeply involved with a group assisting Senator Joseph Biden in putting together a
strategy to defeat Bork's nomination. Mark Gitenstein, Matters of Principle: An Insider's
Account of America's Rejection of Robert Bork's Nomination to the Supreme Court 60-61
(Simon & Schuster 1992). In late June 1987, when Justice Lewis Powell announced his
resignation from the Supreme Court, Senator Biden immediately set up a conference call
that included Kurland, Laurence Tribe, Ken Bass, and Floyd Abrams. Id at 24. This be-
came a working group of academics advising Biden throughout the hearings. See Edward
Walsh, For Committee Staff, Time to Get Ready for Bork; Confirmation Drama to Sup-
plant Iran-Contra Hearings as Capitol Hill's Main Event, The Washington Post A13
(Aug 11, 1987). This was not Kurland's first foray into the politics of judicial nomina-
tions-he had worked with Tribe the year before in opposing the appointment of Daniel
Manion to the Seventh Circuit. Gitenstein, Matters of Principle at 160. When inter-
viewed on the television show Meet the Press, Kurland remarked, "The one thing we
know is that the senate should not be asked to consent to the appointment of both Dr.
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde." This quote would become the central theme in a Time magazine
cover story that included two identical pictures of Judge Bork side by side-one upside
down. Id at 200-0 1.
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and his coeditor, Professor Ralph Lerner, had recently collected
historical materials for the section on the Ninth Amendment in
The Founders' Constitution, none of these materials involved ac-
tual discussion of the ratified amendment by its framers, ratifi-
ers, or early constitutional commentators.9 Omitted from the col-
lection is Ninth Amendment-framer James Madison's speech
describing the ratified Ninth Amendment as working in tandem
with the Tenth Amendment to protect the retained powers and
rights of the states.10 Likewise omitted is a discussion of the
Ninth Amendment by another one of its framers, John Page,
who also described the Ninth Amendment as working alongside
the Tenth in order to preserve the autonomy of the states.11 Nor
does the collection include a discussion of the Ninth Amendment
in the first constitutional commentary by St. George Tucker.12
Although the collection uses Tucker's work in numerous other
sections, it does not include Tucker's description of the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments as jointly requiring a strict construction
of federal power. 13 Finally, despite including numerous judicial
opinions from the same period, Kurland's collection omits the
first Supreme Court opinion discussing the Ninth Amendment
by Justice Joseph Story, in which Story described the Amend-
ment as, you guessed it, limiting the scope of federal power in
order to preserve the same in the states. 14 In short, the historical
9 The only materials actually dealing with the Ninth Amendment in the section
labeled "Amendment IX" are a paragraph from Madison's speech introducing the first
draft of the amendment, two paragraphs from the drafting debates, and one paragraph
from Joseph Story's 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution. See Kurland, 5 Founders'
Constitution at 399-400 (cited in note 6). For comparison, the section on the First
Amendment religion clauses includes extensive postratification discussion and case law,
including speeches and letters by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, major sections
of St. George Tucker's "View of the Constitution of the United States," and early case
law. Id at 94-110.
10 James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (1791), in Jack
N. Rakove, ed, Madison: Writings 480, 488-89 (Library of America 1999).
11 John Page, Address to the Freeholders of Gloucester County, at Their Election of a
Member of Congress, to Represent Their District, and of Their Delegates, and a Senator,
to Represent Them in the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, April 24,
1799 12-13 (John Dixon 1799). Page was a member of Congress from 1789 to 1797 and
Governor of Virginia from 1802 to 1805. Page, John (1742 - 1808), Biographical Directory
of the United States Congress, online at http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl
?index=P000018 (visited Nov 1, 2013).
12 St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in St. George
Tucker, ed, 1 Blackstone's Commentaries: with Notes of Reference, to the Constitution and
Laws, of the Federal Government of the United States; and of the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia at 140, 154 (Birch and Small 1803).
13 Id.
14 See Houston u Moore, 18 US 1, 20-21 (1820) (Story dissenting).
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record regarding the ratified Ninth Amendment powerfully sup-
ports Judge Bork's intuition that the Ninth Amendment is best
read as working with, and not against, the federalist Tenth
Amendment. Yet none of this evidence was included in the col-
lection that Kurland insisted proved Judge Bork was so terribly
misguided on the matter that he was not qualified to sit on the
Supreme Court.
In fairness to Professor Kurland, almost none of this evi-
dence was widely recognized by legal scholars in 1987. Instead,
the vast majority of constitutional scholars at the time believed
the Ninth Amendment somehow protected individual natural
rights, while the Tenth Amendment (perhaps) protected state
powers. This is why Professor Kurland included materials on
Blackstone and natural rights in his section purporting to pre-
sent documents relating to the Ninth Amendment. 15This widely
held presumption also likely explains why, when Kurland and
his staff actually identified a piece of historical evidence relating
to the early understanding of the Ninth Amendment, they nev-
ertheless decided to leave it out of the collection. Written by
Judge John Grimke, one of the ratifiers of the original Constitu-
tion, the opinion in State v Antonio16 described the Ninth
Amendment as working in tandem with the Tenth, just as Judge
Bork suggested. Here is Judge Grimke:
[I]t does not appear that the power of punishing persons for
passing counterfeit coin, knowing it to be counterfeit, was
either expressly given to the Congress of the United States,
or divested out of the individual States. Now the 9th section
of the amendments to the constitution, as agreed to by the
several States, and which has now become a component part
of the constitution, declares, that the enumeration in the
constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people; and in the 10th
section of the same, it is further provided, that the powers
not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the State, are reserved to the States, re-
spectively, or to the people. When we examine the powers
conceded by the individual States, we find no enumeration
of this power given to Congress, and when we review the
powers denied to the individual States, we discover no
15 See Kurland, 5 Founders' Constitution at 388-97 (cited in note 6).
16 3 Brev 562 (1816).
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mention whatever of their being divested of this power. The
individual States were in possession of this power before the
ratification of the constitution of the United States; and if
there is no express declaration in that instrument, which
deprives them of it, they must still retain it, unless they
should be divested thereof by construction, or implication.17
The Founders' Constitution includes a great many state
court opinions written during the same period as State v Anto-
nio.18 In fact, Kurland and his staff not only discovered the An-
tonio opinion, they initially prepared the case for publication.19
Nevertheless, Kurland and Lerner chose to omit what appears
to have been the only judicial discussion of the ratified Ninth
Amendment that they managed to find. You can still find the
copied and pasted version of the case in the papers of Philip
Kurland in the Special Collections Research Center at the Uni-
versity of Chicago Library. It's in Box 86 of Kurland's papers on
The Founders' Constitution, in a folder marked "Not Used.
Amendment X."20 Had Kurland and Lerner viewed Antonio as a
clue rather than an obscure (and presumably unhelpful) outlier,
they might have eventually discovered that Judge Bork was not
only right to suspect the Ninth Amendment was originally
linked to the Tenth, he was especially right to counsel judicial
humility until we had more information.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
Historical evidence from the founding generation unani-
mously, and expressly, supports Antonio's vision of the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments working together to limit federal power
in order to preserve the reserved rights and powers of the people
in the states. Together they protected the retained right of local
self-government. James Madison, principal author of the Ninth
17 Id at 567-68.
18 See, for example, People u Ruggles, 8 Johns 290 (NY 1811), reprinted in Kurland,
5 Founders' Constitution at 101 (cited in note 6); Updegraph u Commonwealth, 11 Serg &
Rawle 394 (Pa 1824), reprinted in Kurland, 5 Founders' Constitution at 170 (cited in note 6).
19 Kurland's research files for The Founders' Constitution contain a folder with a
copy of Antonio pasted on separate pieces of paper. See Special Collections Research
Center, University of Chicago Library, Papers for Philip B. Kurland, Box 86, Folder 2
("Not Used, Amendment X").
20 Just to underscore Kurland and Lerner's view that Antonio was about the Tenth
Amendment, but not the Ninth, there is a citation to the case at the end of The Founders'
Constitution section on the Tenth Amendment. See Kurland, 5 Founders' Constitution at
407 (cited in note 6).
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Amendment, explained that the Ninth Amendment "guard[s]
against a latitude of interpretation" while the Tenth "exclud[es]
every source of power not within the Constitution itself."21 Madi-
son insisted that these two amendments worked together to
"limit the powers of the general government, and protect those
of state government."22 St. George Tucker, author of the first
constitutional treatise, agreed with Madison. Tucker, professor
at the College of William & Mary from 1788-1804, wrote in his
influential "View of the Constitution of the United States" that
the Ninth Amendment guarded the people's collective right to
alter or abolish their form of government. According to Tucker,
under the principles of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, "the
powers delegated to the federal government, are, in all cases, to
receive the most strict construction that the instrument will
bear, where the rights of a state or of the people, either collec-
tively, or individually, may be drawn in question."23 Justice Jo-
seph Story, in the first Supreme Court opinion to discuss the
Ninth Amendment, read the Ninth as preserving the concurrent
powers of state majorities. 24 There is much more. 25 In fact, every
legal treatise and judicial opinion written in the first one hun-
dred years of the Constitution either expressly links the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments or describes the amendments as limit-
ing the powers of the federal government in order to preserve
areas of autonomy to the states. 26
Unfortunately, when Judge Bork appeared before the Judi-
ciary Committee, this evidence remained unknown or unrecog-
nized. In fact, most of this evidence was hiding in plain sight.
Madison's 1791 speech opposing the Bank of the United States
was well known, but Madison's reference to the Ninth Amend-
ment was generally unrecognized because Madison's referred to
the Ninth as the "11th" proposed amendment.27 Congress originally
21 Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank at 489 (cited in note 10).
22 Id at 490.
23 Tucker, View of the Constitution at 154 (cited in note 12).
24 See Houston u Moore, 18 US 1, 49-51 (1820) (Story dissenting).
25 See generally Kurt T. Lash, The Lost History of the Ninth Amendment 139-226
(Oxford 2009).
26 Id.
27 Here is the relevant portion of Madison's speech:
The explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves, at least,
would be good authority with them; all these renunciations of power proceeded
on a rule of construction, excluding the latitude now contended for. These ex-
planations were the more to be respected, as they had not only been proposed
by Congress, but ratified by nearly three-fourths of the states. He read several
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proposed twelve amendments to the Constitution with our Ninth
and Tenth being eleventh and twelfth on the original list. In his
speech, Madison used what was then the common convention of
referring to the proposed amendments according to their place
on the list. As time went on and it became clear that only ten of
the proposed amendments would be ratified,28 this convention
changed, and by the mid-nineteenth century, the eleventh was
commonly referred to as the "Ninth Amendment." This changed
convention had the effect of obscuring early references to the
Ninth Amendment like that contained in Madison's speech.
The same was true for the first constitutional treatise, St.
George Tucker's "View of the Constitution."29 Tucker's essay on
the American Constitution was published in the appendixes of
his 1803 annotated edition of Blackstone's Commentaries. Based
on lectures that Tucker delivered while teaching at William &
Mary during the 1790s, Tucker's "View of the Constitution" was
easily the most influential scholarly work on the American Con-
stitution in the early decades of the republic, and they remained
influential long afterward.30 As had Madison, Tucker believed
the proper construction of federal power was limited by amend-
ments "eleven" and "twelve":
[As a federal compact, the Constitution] is to be construed
strictly, in all cases where the antecedent rights of a state
may be drawn in question [citing amendment "twelve"]; as a
social compact it ought likewise to receive the same strict
construction, wherever the right of personal liberty, of per-
sonal security, or of private property may become the sub-
ject of dispute; because every person whose liberty or prop-
erty was thereby rendered subject to the new government,
was antecedently a member of a civil society to whose regu-
lations he had submitted himself, and under whose authori-
ty and protection he still remains, in all cases not expressly
submitted to the new government [citing amendments
of the articles proposed, remarking particularly on the 11th and 12th. [T]he
former, as guarding against a latitude of interpretation-the latter, as exclud-
ing every source of power not within the constitution itself.
Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank at 489 (cited in note 10).
28 Or, at least only ten amendments would be immediately ratified. The first
amendment on the original list of twelve was finally ratified in 1992. See US Const
Amend XXVII.
29 Tucker, View of the Constitution at 140 (cited in note 12).
30 See Kurt T. Lash, "Tucker's Rule": St. George Tucker and the Limited Construc-
tion of Federal Power, 47 Wm & Mary L Rev 1343, 1382-89 (2006).
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"eleven" and "twelve"]. The few particular cases in which he
submits himself to the new authority, therefore, ought not
to be extended beyond the terms of the compact, as it might
endanger his obedience to that state to whose laws he still
continues to owe obedience; or may subject him to a double
loss, or inconvenience for the same cause. 31
Tucker's eleventh and twelfth amendments, of course, are
what we call the Ninth and Tenth. Tucker not only shared Mad-
ison's view of a "federalist" Ninth Amendment, at the time that
he wrote, no one had offered any other view of the Ninth
Amendment. If one is tempted to dismiss either Madison or
Tucker as having unduly narrow conceptions of national power,
the same reading of the amendment is presented by Justice Jo-
seph Story in the first Supreme Court opinion discussing the
Ninth Amendment. Story, who shared John Marshall's broad
view of national power, nevertheless understood the Ninth
Amendment as calling for a limited construction of federal power
in order to preserve the retained powers and prerogatives of the
states. In Houston v Moore,32 Story insisted that "the letter and
spirit" of the Ninth Amendment (which he referred to as the
"eleventh amendment") called for a limited construction of the
exclusive powers of the federal government in order to preserve
the reserved powers of the states. As Story put it,
[A] reasonable interpretation of [the Constitution] neces-
sarily leads to the conclusion, that the powers so granted
are never exclusive of similar powers existing in the States,
unless where the constitution has expressly in terms given
an exclusive power to Congress, or the exercise of a like
power is prohibited to the States, or there is a direct repug-
nancy or incompatibility in the exercise of it by the States.
... In all other cases not falling within the classes already
mentioned, it seems unquestionable that the States retain
concurrent authority with Congress, not only upon the letter
and spirit of the eleventh amendment of the constitution, but
upon the soundest principles of general reasoning. 33
All of the available evidence from the early decades of the
Constitution expressly links the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
31 Tucker, View of the Constitution at 151 (cited in note 12).
32 18 US 1 (1820).
33 Id at 49 (Story dissenting) (emphasis added).
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as co-guardians of the federalist right to local self-government.34
Nor is there any evidence that the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment had any impact on the original federalist under-
standing of the Ninth Amendment. By the time of the Civil War,
the Ninth Amendment had a long history of being associated
with states' rights, to the point that the seceding states relied on
the federalist understanding of the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments in support of their right to leave the Union.35 Although
the Fourteenth Amendment required the states to respect the
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,"36 its
proponents described these privileges and immunities as includ-
ing the rights listed in the first eight amendments.37 Although
some scholars have tried to argue the unenumerated individual
rights of the Ninth Amendment became applicable against the
states by way of the Privileges or Immunities Clause,38 this re-
flects both an erroneous understanding of the original Ninth
Amendment and an ahistorical account of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Over the last few decades, historians like Professor
Eric Foner, Professor William E. Nelson, and others have recog-
nized the continued commitment to federalism in the Thirty-
Ninth Congress.39 During the debates of the Thirty-Ninth
34 For an exhaustive account of this history, see generally Lash, The Lost History of
the Ninth Amendment at 139-226 (cited in note 25).
35 See Cong Globe, 36th Cong, 2d Sess 212-17 (Dec 31, 1860) (Senator Benjamin).
36 US Const Amend XIV.
37 See Cong Globe, 39th Cong, 1st Sess 2765 (May 18, 1866) (Senator Howard);
Cong Globe, 42nd Cong, 1st Sess App 84 (Mar 31, 1871) (Representative Bingham).
38 See, for example, Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution 60-68
(Princeton 2004).
39 See Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution 1863-1877, 242
(Harper & Row 1988) (stating that Republican moderates "accepted the enhancement of
national power resulting from the Civil War, but they did not believe the legitimate
rights of the states had been destroyed, or the traditional principles of federalism eradi-
cated."); William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to Ju-
dicial Doctrine 114 (Harvard 1988) ("Most Republican supporters of the [Fourteenth]
amendment, like the Democrat opponents, feared centralized power and did not want to
see state and local power substantially curtailed."); id at 27-39 (discussing the continued
commitment to principles of federalism in the Reconstruction Congress). See also Mi-
chael Les Benedict, Preserving the Constitution: The Conservative Basis of Radical Re-
construction, 61 J Am Hist 65, 67 (1974) ("[M]ost Republicans [during Reconstruction]
never desired a broad, permanent extension of national legislative power."); Earl M.
Maltz, Civil Rights, the Constitution, and Congress 1863 1869 60 (Kansas 1990) ("The
disposition of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill and the apportionment amendment demon-
strated that only those civil rights measures that received virtually unanimous support
from mainstream Republicans could be adopted."); id at 30 ("The task [of Reconstruction]
was further complicated by the Republicans' firm attachment to the basic structure of
American federalism.").
Congress, the drafter of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, John
Bingham, announced, "this dual system of national and State
government under the American organization is the secret of our
strength and power. I do not propose to abandon it."40 As I ex-
plore in detail elsewhere,41 there is no evidence the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment drafted a clause that fundamentally
altered the basic federalist system of constitutional government
or altered the basic original understanding of the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments.
Griswold v Connecticut marked the beginning of the modern
transformation of the Ninth Amendment into a possible source
of unenumerated rights. The factual background of Griswold
and the manner in which it reached the Supreme Court are wor-
thy of another book.42 Suffice to say, the case was less about in-
validating a moldy Connecticut law banning the distribution of
contraceptives to married couples (which was never enforced an-
yway) and more about getting the Supreme Court to embrace
the unenumerated right to privacy. Justice William 0. Douglas's
majority opinion in Griswold has received no small degree of
grief from legal scholars-including scholars who support the
decision's embrace of a right to privacy. From merely "not per-
sua[sive]"43 to "an amateur exercise in metaphysical poetry,"44
Justice Douglas's evocation of penumbral emanations has long
been the subject of polite criticism among friends and open ridi-
cule by critics-a rather ironic outcome given that Douglas's pe-
numbral approach was developed at the suggestion of his col-
leagues on the bench. Douglas's original draft opinion had
focused on the First Amendment associational rights of married
couples.45 Although he spoke of association as a right within the
40 Cong Globe, 39th Cong, 2d Sess 450 (Jan 14, 1867) (Representative Bingham).
41 See generally Kurt T. Lash, American Privileges and Immunities: Federalism,
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Rights of American Citizenship (Cambridge forth-
coming 2014).
42 Perhaps the most comprehensive discussion of the case and its background can
be found in David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making
of Roe v. Wade (California 1998).
43 Levinson, 64 Chi Kent L Rev at 135-36 (cited in note 5) (arguing that Justice
Douglas's "attempt to arrive at marital privacy through an exegesis of the Bill of Rights
simply does not persuade").
44 Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 Harv L Rev 1047, 1113
(2002) ("Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court reads more like an amateur exercise in
metaphysical poetry than law. . . . Strikingly, though, his argument seems unpersuasive.
The reason is simple: it looks like all the reasoning is being done by a patchwork of im-
ages and metaphors.").
45 According to Douglas's original draft:
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penumbra of the First Amendment, his analysis was limited to
that particular text. When Douglas circulated his original draft
to his fellow justices on the Court, however, Justice William
Brennan worried that the broad First Amendment analysis
might be used in later cases to protect the associational rights of
Communists.46 Accordingly, in a private note, Brennan urged
Douglas to find some other way to reach the same result:
If a suitable formulation can be worked out, I would prefer a
theory based on privacy, which, as you point out, is the real
interest vindicated here....
Instead of expanding the First Amendment right of associa-
tion to include marriage, why not say that what has been
done for the First Amendment can also be done for some of
The association of husband and wife is not mentioned in the Constitution nor
in the Bill of Rights. Neither is any other kind of association. The right to edu-
cate a child in a school of the parents' choice-whether public or parochial-is
also not mentioned. Nor is the right to study any particular subject or any for-
eign language. Yet the First Amendment has been construed to include certain
of those peripheral rights.
William 0. Douglas, Draft Griswold Opinion 3, available at the Library of Congress, Pa-
pers of William 0. Douglas, Box 1347, no 496 (typed draft, riders, penciled draft). See
also id at 5:
Marriage does not fit precisely any of the categories of First Amendment
rights. But it is a form of association as vital in the life of a man or woman as
any other and perhaps more so. We would indeed have difficulty protecting the
intimacies of one's relationship to NAACP and not the intimacies of one's mar-
riage relation.
46 According to the case notes prepared by Brennan's clerks that year:
Justice Douglas showed an early draft of his opinion in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, to Justice Brennan, and asked for his suggestions. In that
draft, Justice Douglas adopted a First Amendment approach, likening the hus-
band-wife relationship to other forms of association already given First
Amendment protection. Somewhat alarmed by this approach, Justice Brennan
sent a note the following morning outlining the approach eventually adopted
by the Court. It was possible to persuade Justice Douglas to abandon the First
Amendment approach by showing that the "association" of married couples had
little to do with advocacy-and that so broad-gauged an approach might lead to
First Amendment protection for the Communist Party simply because it was a
group, an approach Justice Douglas had rejected in the original Communist
Party registration case. To save as much of the original approach as possible, it
was suggested that the expansion of the First Amendment to include associa-
tion be used as an analogy to justify a similar approach in the area of privacy.
... [Brennan] did join Justice Goldberg's opinion, which elaborated the same
basic ideas at somewhat greater length.
William T. Finley Jr and S. Paul Posner, Case Notes on Griswold, available at the Li-
brary of Congress, Papers of William J. Brennan, Box II: 6.
the other fundamental guarantees of the Bill of Rights? In
other words, where fundamentals are concerned, the Bill of
Rights guarantees are but expressions or examples of those
rights, and do not preclude applications or extensions of
those rights to situations unanticipated by the Framers.
Whether, in doing for other guarantees what has been done
for speech and assembly in the First Amendment, we pro-
ceed by an expansive interpretation of those guarantees or
by application of the Ninth Amendment admonition that the
enumeration of rights is not exhaustive, the result is the
same. The guarantees of the Bill of Rights do not necessari-
ly resist expansion to fill in the edges where the same fun-
damental interests are at stake.47
Following Brennan's advice, Douglas abandoned his original
"marital association" approach and drafted an opinion tracking
Brennan's suggestion that he locate the right to privacy in an
amalgam of several provisions in the Bill of Rights. Scholars
have generally viewed Douglas's opinion as an unpersuasive ef-
fort to avoid repeating the sin of Lochner v New York.48 But by
moving to a general metaphor of penumbras emanating from the
Bill of Rights in general (rather than just a penumbral reading
of the First Amendment itself), Douglas lost touch with the text
of the Constitution altogether, far more so than he would have
had he followed his original instinct and focused on the associa-
tional aspect of the First Amendment. The result was an opinion
that elicited "giggles" from the other Supreme Court clerks at
the time49 and knowing smiles from law students ever since.
III. JUSTICE ARTHUR GOLDBERG'S OPINION
Uneasy about Justice Douglas's approach, Chief Justice
Earl Warren initially resisted joining his opinion and apparently
discussed his doubts with Justice Arthur Goldberg.50 Goldberg,
who was eager to follow up on his Ninth Amendment query at
47 William Brennan, Note from William Brennan to William 0. Douglas (Apr 24,
1965), available at the Library of Congress, Papers of William 0. Douglas, Box 1347, no 496.
48 198 US 45 (1905). For an example, see Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102
Harv L Rev 737, 802 (1989) (suggesting that "what drove privacy into the penumbras ...
was a perceived need to differentiate the privacy doctrine from the language of substan-
tive due process"). Rubenfeld continued, "[T]his insecurity on privacy's part ... resulted
in the very thing feared; by resorting to shadows, the right to privacy has simply invited
critics to expose it-and to brand it, of course, with the scarlet letter of Lochnerism." Id.
49 See Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality at 249 (cited in note 42).
50 Id.
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oral argument, decided to use the unease over Douglas's opinion
as an opportunity to draft an opinion focusing on the Ninth. Ex-
panding on Justice Douglas's brief citation to the Ninth
Amendment in the majority opinion, Justice Goldberg argued
that the Ninth Amendment "lends strong support" to the idea
that liberty protected against state action by the Fourteenth
Amendment "is not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in
the first eight amendments."51 Building his historical case on his
partial knowledge of the works of James Madison and Joseph
Story,52 Goldberg insisted that "[t]he Amendment is almost en-
tirely the work of James Madison. It was introduced in Congress
by him and passed the House and Senate with little or no debate
and virtually no change in language."53 Goldberg was wrong on
both counts: the Amendment was first suggested by the Virginia
Assembly, and Madison's initial draft was significantly altered
before being submitted to the states (half of Madison's original
draft was erased).54 Goldberg's biggest mistake, however, was
his assumption that the Ninth Amendment protected only indi-
vidual unenumerated rights and had nothing to do with preserv-
ing the collective rights of the people in the several states. By
assuming that the retained rights of the Ninth Amendment
were solely individual in nature, Goldberg was able to make a
direct analogy between the unenumerated individual rights of
the Ninth Amendment (which bound the federal government)
and the undefined individual liberties of the Fourteenth
Amendment (which bound the states). Accordingly, Goldberg
concluded that limiting the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment
to just those incorporated rights expressly mentioned in the
Constitution would "ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it
no effect whatsoever."55
What we now know, however, is this is precisely the effect
the Ninth Amendment was supposed to have. Together with the
Tenth Amendment, the Ninth Amendment was meant to pre-
vent federal intrusion (including federal judicial intrusion) into
the affairs of the states except in regard to those matters "ex-
pressly mentioned in the Constitution." Justice Goldberg did
not know this, of course, much of the history remaining yet
51 Griswold, 381 US at 493.
52 Id at 488-90.
53 Id at 488.
54 See Lash, The Lost History of the Ninth Amendment at 17-64 (cited in note 25).
55 Griswold, 381 US at 491.
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undiscovered (or unnoticed). Absent this history, Goldberg
could look at the Ninth Amendment the way a person might
look at an inkblot: perceiving within its shape ideas more reflec-
tive of the internal preferences of the observer than any intend-
ed pattern on the page.
CONCLUSION
This brings us back to Judge Robert Bork. In the face of ep-
istemic uncertainty, Judge Bork refused to pour content into the
unexplored Ninth Amendment. Judge Bork's inkblot did not
represent his rejection of the text, but an altogether appropriate
stance of judicial humility. In time, scholars would investigate
the history of the Amendment and uncover evidence pointing in
a very different direction than that presumed by Justice Gold-
berg in Griswold. Some of that history had already been discov-
ered by Philip Kurland himself when he testified against Judge
Bork's confirmation. The fact that Kurland's discovery remained
in a box instead of being published to the world says something
about the power of preconceived assumptions about the Consti-
tution and its history. It also confirms that Judge Bork was
right to recommend nonenforcement until we knew something
about what it was that the People were trying to enforce.
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